What it would really take to stop Putin fighting in Ukraine

Vladimir Putin may have a reputation among some as a ruthless autocrat, a master manipulator of the international scene. But one thing Russia’s president does not have is a poker face.

The late US Senator John McCain used to joke that when he looked into Putin’s eyes, he saw three things, “a K and a G and a B”, a reference to his past life as a Soviet intelligence officer.

I thought of this as I watched footage of Russia’s leader sitting opposite American envoys in the Kremlin. He could not hide his emotions; he exuded an air of supreme confidence.

For President Putin reckons the diplomatic tide has turned in his favour, with an improved relationship with America and gains on the battlefield.

Some analysts say Putin has no incentive to retreat from his demands: that Ukraine gives up the last 20% of Donetsk it still controls; that all occupied territory is recognised internationally as Russian; that Ukraine’s army is curtailed to a point of impotence; and Nato membership is ruled out forever.

As things stand, there are a few possible scenarios. The first is that US President Donald Trump may try to force Ukraine into a ceasefire on terms unwelcome to its people, one that cedes territory and lacks sufficient security guarantees to deter future Russian aggression.

If Ukraine demurs or Russia vetoes, President Trump has hinted he could wash his hands of the war; last week, he said “sometimes you have to let people fight it out”.

He could remove the vital US intelligence Ukraine needs to detect incoming Russian drones and target Russian energy facilities.

Another possibility is that the war could just stumble on with Russia’s forces continuing to make slow advances in the east.

The Trump administration’s new national security strategy implied that Russia is no longer an “existential threat” to the US, and urged the US to “re-establish strategic stability” with Russia.

So, with American support for Ukraine in serious question, what – if anything – could potentially change Putin’s mind? And what else could Ukraine, Europe and even China, do differently?

At the moment, the continent is preparing for a ceasefire. Under the banner of the “coalition of the willing”, it is preparing an international military force to help Ukraine deter future Russian invasion, alongside a financial effort to help reconstruct the war-ravaged country.

But some officials suggest that Europe should instead prepare for the war to muddle on.

They want to help Ukraine not only “win the fight tonight”, with more drones and cash; but also provide longer term support and prepare for a 15 to 20 year war with Russia.

Europe could also do more to help protect Ukrainian skies from drones and missiles. There is already a plan – called the European Sky Shield Initiative – which could be expanded to allow European air defences to protect western Ukraine.

Others argue European troops could be deployed to western Ukraine to help patrol borders, freeing up Ukrainian soldiers to fight on the front line. Most proposals such as this have been rejected for fear of provoking Russia or escalating the conflict.

Keir Giles, senior consulting fellow at the Russia and Eurasia programme at Chatham House think tank, said these fears were based on “nonsense” because Western troops were already present on the ground and Sky Shield could be deployed in western Ukraine with little chance of any clash with Russian aircraft.

European leaders, in his view, had to “insert themselves into the conflict in a manner that will actually make a difference”.

Mr Giles said: “The only thing that will unarguably, undeniably stop Russian aggression is the presence of sufficiently strong western forces where Russia wants to attack, and the demonstrated will and resolve that they will be used to defend.”

This strategy would of course come with huge political difficulty – with some voters in western Europe unwilling to risk a confrontation with Russia.

Few analysts expect Ukraine to reverse the tide and make actual territorial gains of its own.

Having spent several weeks in Ukraine recently, I heard no mention of any Spring offensive, only the need to slow Russia’s advance and increase the price it pays in blood and treasure.

Some western diplomats claim Russia’s generals are lying to the Russian president, pretending the situation on the ground is better than it is – adding to what they see as a deliberate strategy to exaggerate Russian gains, designed to suggest Ukraine is on the back foot and should thus sue for peace.

According to Thomas Graham in Foreign Affairs, in this year, Russia has seized only 1% of Ukrainian territory at a cost of more than 200,000 dead and wounded.

Fiona Hill, senior fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution, who served on Trump’s national security council during his first term, says the biggest thing Putin has in his favour is that many people believe Ukraine is losing.

“Everyone is talking of Ukraine as the loser when it now has the most potent military in Europe,” she says.

“Just think what they have done to Russia. It is remarkable they have held off for so long not least fighting with one hand behind their back.”

Then there’s the lever of sanctions. Certainly, Russia’s economy is suffering. Inflation at 8%, interest rates 16%, growth slowed, budget deficits soaring, real incomes plunging, consumer taxes rising.

A report for the Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform says Russia’s war economy is running out of time. “The Russian economy is substantially less able to finance the war than it was at the beginning of it in 2022,” the authors say.

But so far none of this appears to have changed much Kremlin thinking, not least because businesses have found ways of evading restrictions, such as transporting oil on unregistered ghost ships.

Tom Keatinge, director of the Centre for Finance and Security at Rusi, said western messaging about sanctions was convoluted and there were too many loopholes.

Russia would, he said, work around recent US sanctions on two Russian oil giants, Lukoil and Rosneft, just by re-labelling the exported oil as coming from non-sanctioned companies.

Mr Keatinge said if the West really wanted to hurt Russia’s war economy, it would embargo all Russian oil and fully implement secondary sanctions on countries that still buy it. “We need to stop being cute and go full embargo,” he said.

“We need to take our implementation of sanctions as seriously as the Kremlin takes circumvention.”

In theory, sanctions could also affect Russian public opinion. In October, a survey by the state-run Public Opinion Research Centre (VCIOM) said 56% of respondents said they felt “very tired” of the conflict, up from 47% last year.

But the consensus among Kremlinologists is that much of the Russian public remains supportive of Putin’s strategy.

The European Union could agree to use about €200bn (£176bn) of frozen Russian assets to generate a so-called “reparation loan” for Ukraine. The latest European Commission proposal is to raise €90bn (£79bn) over two years.

In Kyiv, officials are already banking on getting the cash. But still the EU hesitates.

Belgium, where the bulk of the Russian assets are held, has long feared being sued by Russia – and on Friday, the Russian Central Bank announced legal action against Belgian bank Euroclear in a Moscow court.

Belgium says it will not agree the loan unless legal and financial risks are shared more explicitly with other EU members. France has concerns, such is its own vast debts, and fears exploiting the frozen assets could undermine the stability of the eurozone.

EU leaders will make a further attempt to agree a deal when they meet in Brussels on 18 December for their final summit before Christmas. But diplomats say there is no guarantee of success.

There is also disagreement over what the cash should be used for: keeping Ukraine’s state solvent now or paying for its reconstruction after the war.

As for Ukraine, it could mobilise more of its armed forces.

It remains the second-biggest army in Europe (behind Russia), and the most technically advanced – but it is nonetheless struggling to defend an 800-mile frontline.

After almost four years of war, many soldiers are exhausted and desertion rates are rising.

Army recruiters are finding it harder to fill gaps as some younger men hide from press gangs or flee the country. But Ukraine could widen its conscription laws.

Currently only men aged 25 to 60 must be available to fight. This is a deliberate strategy by Kyiv to manage Ukraine’s demographic challenges; a country with a low birth rate and millions living abroad cannot afford to lose what have been dubbed “the fathers of the future”.

This puzzles outsiders. “I find it incredible that Ukraine has not mobilised its young people,” one senior UK military figure told me.

“I think Ukraine must be one of the only countries in history facing an existential threat that has not thrown its mad 20-year-olds into the fight.”

Fiona Hill said Ukraine had simply learned the lesson of history and the devastating impact World War One had on 20th Century European empires, which declined after failing to rediscover the population growth that had fuelled their economic rise.

“Ukraine is just thinking of their demographic [future].”

If Ukraine could import and manufacture more long-range missiles, it could hit Russia harder and deeper.

This year it stepped up its air strikes on targets both in occupied territory and the Russian Federation. Earlier this month Ukraine’s military commanders told Radio Liberty they had hit more than 50 fuel and military-industrial infrastructure facilities in Russia during the autumn.

Alexander Gabuev, director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, says some Russians experienced fuel shortages earlier this year. “By late October, Ukrainian drones had hit more than half of Russia’s thirty-eight major refineries at least once.

“Production outages spread across multiple regions, and some Russian gas stations began rationing fuel.”

But would more deep strikes on Russia make an impact, when both the Kremlin and public opinion in Russia seem indifferent?

Mick Ryan, former Australian major general and now fellow of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, says deep strikes are not a magic bullet.

“They are an extraordinarily important military endeavour, but insufficient by themselves to force Putin to the negotiating table or to win the war.”

Dr Sidharth Kaushal, senior research fellow in military sciences at the Royal United Services Institute (Rusi) think tank, said more deep strikes would certainly damage Russia’s energy and military infrastructure, as well as using up its air defence missiles. But he warned the tactic could be counterproductive.

“It could reinforce the argument the Russian leadership makes that an independent Ukraine poses a massive military threat,” he said.

There’s also – still – a diplomatic route.

Some analysts argue that if Putin is offered a way out of the war, he may choose it.

The theory goes like this: a deal is agreed that allows both sides to claim victory. Say, a ceasefire along the line of contact; some areas demilitarised; no formal territorial recognition. Compromises all round.

But the deal would require the US to engage hard with Russia, setting up negotiating teams, using its power to drive through agreement.

“The United States… needs to deploy its formidable psychological leverage it possesses over Russia,”

Thomas Graham argues. “One cannot overstate the role the United States – and Trump personally – plays in validating Russia as a great power and Putin as a global leader.”

The wild card is China. President Xi Jinping is one of the few world leaders Putin listens to. When Xi warned earlier in the conflict against Russian threats of nuclear weapon use, the Kremlin fell swiftly in line.

Russia’s war machine is also huge dependent on China’s supply of dual use goods – such as electronics or machinery that can be used for civilian and military purposes.

So if Beijing decided it was no longer in China’s interests for the war to continue, then it would have substantial leverage over Kremlin thinking.

For now, the US shows no sign of trying to encourage – or force – China to put pressure on Moscow. So the question is whether President Xi would be willing to apply any leverage off his own bat.

At the moment China seems happy for the US to be distracted, for transatlantic allies to be divided, and for the rest of the world to view China as a source of stability. But if Russia’s invasion escalated, if global markets were disrupted, if the US applied secondary sanctions on China in punishment for its consumption of cheap Russian energy, then the thinking in Beijing might change.

For now though, Putin believes he is sitting pretty, with time on his side. The longer this conflict goes on, analysts say, the more Ukrainian morale will fall, the more divided its allies will become, and the more territory Russia will gain in Donetsk.

“Either we liberate these territories by force of arms or Ukrainian troops leave these territories,” Putin said last week.

“Nothing will change his position,” Fiona Hill told me. “Unless he exits stage left. Putin is betting right now that he can keep this going for long enough that circumstances play out to his advantage.”

Top picture credit: Reuters

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